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APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
:S'L\T~~:\H~NT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an aetion by plaintiff against her husband's 
i!hurmwc' c·ompan~' to recO\'er $5,000 under the uninsured 
nint 11rist provisions of his poliey with said company. It 
im olns an interpretation of the policies of two dif-
L·ti·nt l'ompanies. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER cou1rr 
In the trial court, plaintiff, respondent aitd 1 t' .. 
· ' ( e v1111 
ant, appellant, each made a motion for summar , · 
' } lll1k 
ment. Plaintiff's motion for summary J·udgmei t, 
. l \\ "' 
granted and defendant's denied. Defendant appeal, 
from the trial court's order and judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the summary ju<lgnwo: 
granted in favor of plaintiff and for judgment in di·· 
f endants' favor as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff was riding as a passenger in a vehirl1· 
owned by Earl V. Gritton and driven by Helen j1. Urit-
ton on April 4, 1961, when an accident occurred with :1 
vehicle being driven by one Sharon Mitchell. The 1w1.·i 
dent occurred in the City of Bountiful, DaYis Cou11h, 
Utah. 
As a result of the accident, Sharon .Mitchell 11 :1' 
killed and plaintiff was injured. Sharon Mitchell 1rn' 
uninsured at the time of the accident (R. 12). The Grit 
ton vehicle in which plaintiff was riding was insurrd LY 
United Pacific Insurance Company at the time of 1l1'' 
accident and the coverages included uninsured rootnri~t' 
insurance with a limit of $5,000. Florence Russell '1'1' 
2 
:rn insnred, though not a named insured, under her hus-
i.,11111 's polil'.y with Factory Mutual Liability Insurance 
( ·umpm1) uf America which policy also provided unin-
'llred motorist t:overage with a limit of $5,000 (R. 7). 
Plnintiff filed suit against George M. Paulson, Jr., 
.u; ndmiuistrator of the estate of Sharon Mitchell, de-
., ;1 .·wd; U ui t(•d Pacific Insurance Company and your a p-
pel laut herein, alleging Sharon Mitchell to be uninsured, 
to recon~r damages for her injuries and medical expenses. 
The Jefen<lant, United Pacific Insurance Company, set-
t\('11 with the plaintiff under the uninsured motorist cov-
prage of tl1e Gritton policy for the sum of $4,500 with-
1m! filing- an answer. The defendant Factory Mutual 
Liability Insurance Company of America and Automo-
liilf' ~lutnal Insurance Company of America, which 
~110nld lJe consi<iered as one under the title of Factory 
\[nhrnl Liability Insurance Company of America, denied 
linhilit~, nHd0r its policy on the basis that its uninsured 
motorist COVL'rage was excess only to United Pacific In-
'111 <1n(·e Company's policy on the basis that United Pa-
eific- lusnrmwe Company had the primary coverage and 
tl1at under the terms of the other insurance provisions 
,,f lhe poliey of Factory Mutual there was no coverage. 
~uhseqrn~ntly the plaintiff secured a default judg-
m1·1i( agninst the administrator of the uninsured motorist 
1·-otah• for thP sum of $10,000 plus medical expenses and 
nn" ~('(·ks to eollect $5,000 from the defendant, Factory 
\fntnal Liabilty Insurance Company under the terms of 
ii:; 11ni11s11red motorist provision. 
3 
The two insurance policies under Other J11 , 111·a c ii Cc 
provisions pertaining to uninsured motorist covera!£
0 
provide as follows: 
United Services Policy. 
''Other Insurance - ·with respect to bodih ii! 
jury to an insured while occupying a11 aut~mu 
bile not owned by a named insured under thi.~ ;·n 
dorsement, the insurance hereunder 1:ihall apJih 
only as excess insurance over any other simila·r 
insurance available to such occupant and this in-
surance shall then apply only in the amount h 
which the applicable limit of liability of this t'J;. 
dorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable lim-
its of liability of all such other insurance. 
FACTORY MUTUAL, "OTHER INSUHANCE-Witlt 11-
spect to bodily injury to an insured whil<~ occnp»-
ing an automobile not owned by the named in-
sured, the insurance hereunder shall apply 01tly 
as excess insurance over any other similar insm-
ance available to such occupant and this immnrnce 
shall then apply only in the amount by which !lH· 
applicable limit of liability of this part exceeds till' 
sum of the applicable limits of all such other i11 
surance." (R. 10) 
United Pacific Insurance Company's policy, snh-
paragraph 2, Definitions, under A(2) provides that tlw 
unqualified word "insured" means among other thing.'. 
'' ( 2) Any other person while occupying an insurl'rl 
automobile." (R. 32) 
At the time of this accident, Utah's financial respon-
sibility laws required a motorist to carry a minim11111 
policy of liability insurance in the sum of $5,000 for iii-
4 
jur.1· or deatl1 of ouc person in any one accident and sub-
.i(·d to said limit for one person in the amount of $10,000 
1iecn11~l' of injury or death of two or more persons in any 
one nrrident. U. C. A. 1953, Section 41-12-1, subpara-
;;r:iph (k). 
The trial court, pursuant to the motion of the plain-
11 tf, apparently ruled that the other insurance provisions 
of tlw respective policies were repugnant to each other 
:i11d rnid and granted judgment to the plaintiff for the 
:;nm of $3,000 against the defendant, although there 
11·erc no findings of fact made by the court or prepared 
or filed in tlw case which was kept under advisement for 
8pproximately two and one-half years. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE OTHER INSURANCE PROVISIONS OF 
THE TWO POLICIES ARE NOT CONFLICT-
ING OR REPUGNANT TO EACH OTHER. 
TTNI'I'ED PACIFIC'S COVERAGE IS OTHER 
INRURANCE AVAILABLE TO THE PLAIN-
TIFFS AND FACTORY MUTUAL'S OTHER 
INSURANCE PROVISION IS BINDING UPON 
THE PARTIES TO THE INSURANCE CON-
TRACT. 
It will be noted from reading the two paragraphs 
that t)u.iy are almost identical but do contain some differ-
r·ncr'S wltieb, for the purpose of this argument, can be 
rli,regarded. The application of the two provisions of 
tl 11 • policy to the faets of this accident, however, are en-
5 
tirely different. Paragraph II A(2) of the United hi 
cific policy states that the definition of the worJ · · 
11
, 
sured" means any other person while occupying u;i 
insured autonwbile. Mrs. Russell became an insurer! ui 
United Pacific while occupying the Gritton Yehicle at 
the time of this accident. She was an insured occup~·i 11 ~ 
an automobile O\vned by a named insured under thr 1•1,_ 
dorsement. Therefore, United Pacific's coverage 11 ,1, 
in effect and the policy applied for the full amount of tJ1,. 
coverage. 
·with respect to Factory Mutual 's provisions per-
taining to ''Other Insurance.'' Mrs. Russell was oc. 
cupying an automobile not owned by the named imnnl 
and Factory Mutual 's uninsured motorists coverag-P, 
therefore, in accordance with said paragraph heeam1· 
excess insurance over any other uninsured motori'i 
coverage available to her. United Pacific's insurance ''R' 1 
available to her as an insured under its policy, and tlir 
only question then remaining was whether or uot Far· 
tory Mutual 's insurance as excess coverage would e11rn 1 
into play. The "Other Insurance" paragraph of Fae 
tory Mutual, however, further limits the application or 
this policy as excess coverage by stating that the irn;:ir-
ance should apply only in the amount by which the <111 
plicable limit of liability of Factory l\fotual's unin~uri·il 
coverage exceeded the sum of the applicable limit of Iia 
bility of all such other coverage. In view of the faet tlint 
both policies were in the amount of $5,000, Factory ,\f11 • 
tual 's policy was completely inoperative as to the '1' 
cident. 
6 
fo tlte case of Travelers Indemnity Company of 
f/!lrtforl, ('mrnecficut, Appellant, vs. Mildred Nancy 
W( tis, TL N. Conrt of Appeals, 4th Circuit, April 22, 1963, 
,iJt) FC'd. (2) 770, an action was commenced by the lifl-
hilit.1· insnrer for a judgment declaring that it was not 
!iahle for the death of one insured and injury sustained 
h m10tlier while they were passengers in an automobile 
1wt owned by them. The U. S. District Court for the 
\\'rs tern District of Virginia entered a judgment ad-
rr·rse to the insurer and it appealed. Held on appeal: 
"Under the passenger's auto liability policy con-
taining uninsured motor vehicle endorsement, but 
limiting passenger's recovery for injury suffered 
·while occupying an automobile not owned by them 
to excess of limit under endorsement over limits 
of other similar insurance available to the passen-
g-ers, the passenger's insurer was not liable for 
the cle::ith of one passenger and injury to another 
"·here the uninsured motorist coverage under the 
host's policy equaled the limit under the passen-
ger's policy even though the host's insurance was 
ahsorhed by claims of others." 
P::irngraph 6 of the Travelers Insurance Company 
polir>· provided as follows: 
'' 0THEn INSURANCE - With respect to bodily in-
jnry to an insured while occupying an automo-
bile not owned by the named insured under this 
endorsement, the insurance herem1der shall ap-
ply only as excess insurance over any other simi-
l::i r insurance available to such occupant and this 
insnrance shall then apply only in the amount by 
1d1ich the applicable limit of liability of this en-
dorsement exceeds the sum of the applicable limits 
of liability of all such other insurance." 
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rrhis paragraph is the same as Factory ?II ut n·1l' . I ., ( ~ d 
most word for word. 
In answer to the plaintiff's contention that Tran\1•1, 
Insurance Company was liable for any lntla11e<> on plai 1,. 
tiff's judgment not covered by the automobile o\rn1,1", 
policy the court said : 
"This conclusion we think untenahle. Our 1·011 . 
viction is that in this situation no uninsured pro. 
tection whatsoever was due from Travelers to 1h1' 
\Vells. It was explicitly excluded by the OthPr h 
surance condition. The condition made Fi11Pl-
ity and Casualty the primary insurer, inasmul'11 
as the Wells were 'occupying an automuhil1· 
(Smith's) not owned' by them. Travelers insm-
ance then was confined to the amount by \\·liiC'lt 
its policy limit exceeded that of Fidelity and ('a,. 
ualty, the only other similar insura11ce. Therr \\·a, 
no other 'excess' because the two polieies \\·ere 
each written for the statutory limits and no mor(· 
--$15,000 for one injured and $30,000 for two or 
more. Hence, under the Other Insurance comli-
tion Travelers never became answerahlP to tliP 
vVells to any extent. Their sole insurance "·a~ th1· 
Fidelity and Casualty policy.'' 
In the case of Application of Globe l1lflem11it.11 C1 1111-
pany, Appellant vs. Estate of Abraham Barker, 2:i~.Y.~. 
( 2) 170, decided October 20, 1964, the New York ePu it 
held the excess uninsured motorist coverage did not applY 
in regard to the insured driver's policy \Yhcrc thr driw 1 
was driving a vehicle owned by another arnl where tlii, 
insured 's policy provided that with resped to bodil! 
injury to the insured while occupying an automobile Jilii 
owned by the insured, the insurance woul<l apply only a' 
8 
i·\1rs ills11ra11ce and would apply only in the amount by 
"J 1id1 the applieable limit of liahility exceeded the ap-
plic·;1hle limits of liability of other similar insurance, and 
tlw ;1pplicahl(• limits of liability in the policies of both the 
1·;1r 11\\'m•r a11<1 the driver '.Yere the same. 
~'or a tase directly in point, both as to the actual facts 
;111il tl1e policy provisions invoketl, with the case before 
tl1i~ 1·onrt, see Dorothy Burcham, Avpcllant, vs. Farmers 
fJ1s11ra1u·e H:rthange, loica, l\Iay 7, 1963, 121 N\.V(2) 500, 
11l1i('li ap11lied the same rule as the foregoing cited case 
:wd n·citetl its holding as being the majority rule. 
Jn this ease plaintiff, while riding in an automobile 
rJ11 m·Ll and drin~n by one Ray N avrcal, received injuries 
inn rnllisiou with a car owned by one Beacom. The Bea-
('Olll car and the driver were uninsured. N avrcal carried 
insurance '.\'ith Surety National Insurance Company 
( ~lll'Pf y). rrhis policy provided uninsured motorist COV-
l'l'<lg'C'. Smdy settled its liability with the plaintiff for 
:~:l,100. Its limit for one person was $5,000. 
1'hP plaintiff's father had three identical policies 
11 itl1 t Ii<> cfofendant, Farmers Insurance Exchange, each 
11 1' whi<'h policies provided uninsured motorist coverage 
11 irh a $.J,000 limit on each policy. After settlement with 
~11rd~' the plaintiff brought action against Farmers In-
surance Exchange on the three policies to recover un-
1b· the uninsured motorist provisions of saicl policies. 
l'hr drfcmlant pleaded its excess-escape clause. (This ex-
l'l'~S-Psrape clause is the same as the one in Factory 
\[ utnal 's policy quoted above.) 
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The court held in an unanimous decision tha1 Surpty\ 
policy was other similar insurance available to the 1 », . p ai1,. 
tiff and that Farmers Insurance ExchanO"e •i·a, 
t'> ' 8 l11JI 
liable. 
The court stated that a fair construdion of the j11_ 
tention as expressed in the policies is that each com]Jall' 
intended to provide and the insureds intended to Luy eo1,_ 
erage to the extent stated in the excess-escape clansr· 
Neither policy contains a pure excess clause. Clcarl,1. 
neither company intended an insured to receive rnon 
than $5,000 from all sources while occupying a non-ow1M\ 
automobile. 
The court further said it is clear the company rn-
tended to sell less coverage and the insureds to buy les' 
coverage "while occupying an automobile not owne(l ln 
a named insured.'' (This case has a good discussion prr-
taining to the so-called excess-escape clause.) 
Plantiff 's counsel in his memorandum to the trial 
court and we assume that his brief in this court will 11' 
' 
along the same lines, set forth legal authorities anno1111c· 
ing the rule that where there are two conflicting (":('''" 
insurance clauses which are irreconeilablc, the conrt> 
will hold the clauses mutually repugnant to each otlwr 
and pro rate the loss between the carriers. In onler fur 
this rule to be operative, however, it is uecessary that 
1111 
paragraphs be irreconcilable or that there lJe a cw 
. ted o11: 
flict between such clauses and as has beeu porn . 
there is no conflict in this case. Therefore, the rnlc· vh
1
,
1
'.
1 
. . · 1· bl Plnint1ft · tiff's counsel seeks to mvoke is mapp ica e. 
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coull:-;el in his memorandum to the trial court cited sev-
eral ca:-;es upon which he relied to support his conten-
tioll i11 this case. An examination of the cases upon which 
plaiutiff 's counsel relied will show that in each of them 
tliL·n~ was a definite dispute between the insurance com-
pallies as to which policy would apply and that the actual 
,a[t involved a dispute between the two insurance com-
panies for determination as to which of the insurance 
f'ompanies should have to pay the loss. In other words, 
which should be declared primary and which excess. In 
most of the cases plaintiff's counsel has heretofore cited, 
hotli companies had written policies on the same car. In 
the case before this court, the United Pacific Insurance 
Co. has acknowledged that it is the primary carrier and 
that it was directly liable for the loss. This is in accord-
ance with the general rule as set forth in Appleman's 
lns11rance Law and Practice, Volume 8, Section 4194, at 
Page 400, where it is stated that, 
"Where the owner of an automobile or truck has 
a policy \vith an omnibus clause and the additional 
insured also has an ownership policy which pro-
vides that it shall only constitute excess coverage 
over and above any other valid, collectible insur-
ance, the owner's insurance has the primary 
liability.'' 
An example of cases supporting this rule is Employers 
Liability Assurance Corporation vs. Firemans' Fitnd ln-
s11rancf"'. Group, 1958, 262 Fed(2) 259, District of Colum-
1iia. In that case the facts were that a car belonging to 
Cali Carl, Inc., was loaned to Carl Ray Kilmer to be used 
:i.~ a substitute while his car was being repaired. The 
11 
car was involved in an accident while being drin 11 In 
Kilmer. An injured person sued him and Call Carl, 1
111
. 
The present suit is between the two insurers. F'irern;rn,· 
Fund was Kilmer 's insurer. His coverage included drii-
ing a substitute car because of repairs with the condi-
tion that the insurance with respect to a temporary snh-
stitute automobile ·was excess insurance over any otlt"r 
valid and collectible insurance. Employers was \'all 
Carl's insurer. Its policy defined "insured" as inelurlin~ 
not only the named insured but also any person "·!1ilr· 
using an owned auto ·with permission of the named in-
sured. It also provided that if other valid insurance exist, 
protecting the insured from liability, this policy shall be 
null and void with respect to such specific hazard other-
wise covered whether the insured is specificall~, namer! 
in such other policy or not; provided, however, tlrnt ii' 
the applicable limit of liability of this policy exceeds tl11· 
applicable limit of liability of such other valid insunrnl'c, 
then this policy shall apply as excess insurance agflinst 
any such hazard in an amount equal to the appliefll1lv 
limit of liability of this policy minus the applicable limit 
of liability of such other valid insurance. Employers snrd 
Firemans for a declaratory judgment to declarr Fire-
mans' policy primary and Employers' secondary. Thr· 
court held that Employers' was primary. The excP's 
insurance which Firemans' provided with respect to a 
substitute car was excess insurance only. ·w1wre '1 
substitute car is concerned, unless damage excee1ls tlll' 
dollar limit, the policy is not other valid insuranee. Quot-
ing Zurich General Accident and Liability I11s111·a 1111 
(!ornpany, Ltd. vs. Clamor, 124 Fed(2) 717. 
12 
la lhese cases the policy on the owned automobile 
11 as held to he primary. United Pacific's coverage was 
(Ill i I!!' O\\'Jtecl ('HI' and that of Factory l\Iutual was not on 
tlie ow1wcl car. Factory Mutual 's policy would not be 
nl11l·r ,·ali<l insurance, because under the terms of the 
polu·il's it is excess. The excess, however, is limited to 
!]111 amount by which the applicable limits of liability of 
1•'11tl0r5· Mntual's policy exceeded the applicable limits 
of lrnhiJity of the United Pacific policy. Inasmuch as 
l1utli policies were for $5,000 coverage, there would be no 
cxc·('Ss aml, therefore, no liability to Fr,ctory Mutual, and 
JikL•11·i11e, Factory Mutual 's policy would not be other 
1 alicl insurance. 
The case of Air Transport Manufacturing Compan:it, 
Ltrl., vs. Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Cal-
ifornia, 1949, 204 P(2) 647, defines the phrase "other 
ralicl insurance." The case states that "other valid in-
1rnnmcc" used in public liability policies providing that 
if other rnlid insurance exists protecting the insured, the 
poliry shall be void with respect to such specific hazard 
otlicrwi:-;c covered, means insurance providing an uncon-
ditional coverage of loss even though limited as to 
arnonnt. Factory Mutual 's policy would not qualify un-
dl'r this d0finition. United Pacific Insurance Co. 's would 
111wlify. 
Plaintiff's counsel in his trial court brief relied heav-
ily ou the case of Oregon Auto Insurance Company vs. 
l'. 8. F. & G., 195 Fed(2) 958, in which case each com-
pan~· claimed that it was not liable and that the other 
\\a~ liable and the wording of the policy was such that if 
13 
the wording had been applied strictly neither comvmJ: 
would have paid the loss of the insured. In fact, the cou;t 
said, 
"It is plain that if the provisions of both polieip, 
were given full effect neither insurer would hL· 
liable.'' 
The parties admitted that such a result would protlni·~ 
an unintended absurdity and each argued that the court 
must settle upon some way of determining which polici-
was primary and which secondary. The court in thnl 
case found that the companies should pro rate the 108-. 
The provisions of the United Pacific and the Faetor,1 
Mutual policies do not in any way tend to bring out sm1i 
a result as did the policies in the Oregon Auto Ins11ra11u 
Conipany vs. U. S. F. & G. case. The liability is so clear 
in the United Pacific policy that they have made payment 
under the same without argument, nor have they songl1t 
rn any way to bring in Factory :Mutual for reimbnrsc-
ment. 
In view of the fact that United Pacific is not i11-
volved in this lawsuit this action by the plaintiff amouub 
to an action to have the ''other insurance'' paragraph of 
Factory Mutual declared void, but counsel has not cited 
any cases in point which would hold such paragrnpb 
against public policy or void for any other reason. 
1
:Clli' 
interest of the insurers should be ascertained anc1 ef 
fectuated whenever possible. Factory Mutual ha' 
contracted with its insured to pay the insured up to $.5,00ll 
maximum if the insured is injured through the negli 
gence of an nninsnred motorist \Yhi1e the insnrr<l is rirl 
14 
j11g in the owned automobile of the named insured, but 
fnrther extends the coverage to say we will also apply 
!lie ]J(~nefits of this coverage to you while riding in some-
one else's car if they don't have uninsured motorist cov-
erage which iR applicable to you. If they do have unin-
snn•r1 motorist coverage in an amount equal to the lia-
liility limit of our policy, we will not make any payment 
to .rnn. As previously mentioned, the plaintiff has not 
,.[tell any cases holding that such a provision is unlaw-
ful, arnl under the circumstances the insured and the 
company arc bound by the terms of the contract of in-
:rnrance. 
If the two paragraphs on ''other insurance'' were 
mutually repugnant certainly United Pacific would 
he the first one to say so and try to enforce a contribu-
tion from Factory Mutual. The fact that they have not 
made an appearance or made any such claim certainly 
indicates that the provisions of the policies are not mu-
tually repugnant. United Pacific Insurance Company's 
policy is not in issue, because they have paid off and 
are not contesting the issue. The cardinal rule is that 
the insured should not receive less protection than if he 
were covered by only one policy. 65 Col. L. R. 319, 1965. 
Slte has already received the protection which had been 
rontracted for. She is not entitled to a double recovery. 
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CONCLUSION 
The other insurance provision of Factory Mutn:il i., 
binding upon the insured under the facts of this ca~~. 
The trial court's decision granting plaintiff a sumnrnn 
judgment should be reversed and judgment enterP1l j11 
favor of the defendant, Factory Mutual. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI and 
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYR 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defe1ula1ds 
and Appellants 
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